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ABSTRACT
Research results have shown that more than half of
aviation, aerospace and aeronautics mishaps/incidents
are attributed to human error. As a part of Safety within
space exploration ground processing operations, the
identification and/or classification of underlying
contributors and causes of human error must be
identified, in order to manage human error.
This research provides a framework and methodology
using the Human Error Assessment and Reduction
Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS), as an analysis tool to
identify contributing factors, their impact on human
error events, and predict the Human Error probabilities
(HEPs) of future occurrences. This research
methodology was applied (retrospectively) to six (6)
NASA ground processing operations scenarios and
thirty (30) years of Launch Vehicle related mishap data.
This modifiable framework can be used and followed by
other space and similar complex operations.
1. INTRODUCTION
NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground
Processing Operations (GPO) deals with processing
launch vehicles and space-craft used in the earth’s
atmosphere and beyond [1].
In 1993, NASA found that 78% of the incidents related
to Space Shuttle Ground Processing Operations, since
April 1991, was a result of human error [4].
In this research, human error contributing factors are
identified and a comparative analysis of two existing
tools are conducted to determine the human factors
responsible for the failures, mishaps, etc. [10].
The research hypotheses are: 1) Contributing factors:
unsafe acts of operators, preconditions for unsafe acts,
unsafe supervision, and/or organizational influences
(multiple causes) do not have an impact on human error
events (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident or accidents)
in NASA ground processing operations. 2) The HFACS
framework conceptual model can be proven to be a
viable analysis and classification system to help classify
both latent and active underlying contributors and
causes of human error in NASA ground processing
operations. 3) The development of a model using the
HEART assessment can be used as a tool to help
determine the probability of human error occurrence in
NASA ground processing operations. This research will
focus on the methodology and framework developed for
analyzing the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
human error contributing factors [1].
In order to display relationships between variables, a
conceptual model, such as a theoretical framework was
used. The Generic Error Modeling System (GEMS) was
used to relate the basics (generic) basic error types
presented by James Reason to the three performance
levels presented by Jens Rasmussen [5].
Below is a Table outlining this relationship.
Table 1: Reason’s three Basic Error Types in relation
to Rasmussen’s three Performance Levels (Reason,
1990)
Performance
Level
Error Type Description
Skill-based level Slips and lapses Automated non-
cognizant errors of
automatic
processing
(attention/memory)
during regular
routine actions that
are identified
quickly (Reason,
1990).
Rule-based level Rule-based
mistakes
Errors of rule-
based behavior.
For example:
applying the wrong
rule for a give
situation (often
with a tendency to
keep repeating the
same wrong
actions “strong but
wrong”).
Knowledge-
based level
Knowledge-
based mistakes
Errors of cognitive
(knowledge-based)
processing
whereby a problem
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is not analyzed
correctly (or not at
all) and this results
in an error (e.g.
wrong response to
a multitude of
alarms based on an
incomplete
understanding of
the actual
problem).
This research objective provides a framework and
methodology using the Human Error Assessment and
Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), as an
analysis tool to identify contributing factors, their
impact on human error events, and predict the Human
Error probabilities (HEPs) of future occurrences.
Due to HEART’s quantitative ergonomic approach
through analysis of ergonomic factors that may have
substantial and negative effects on human performance,
it was selected for this research. The technique is
capable of providing human factor specialists with
quantitative supported data for design and other
recommendations for overall improvement [2].
HFACS is considered a comprehensive analysis of
human error that takes into account multiple causes of
human failure [10] and for this reason, it was selected
for this research. The HFACS method has generic terms
and descriptors that allow its use for an array of
industries and activities, thus providing an advantage
[6].
2. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Prior to the development of a Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) Ground Processing Operations (GPO) Human
Error framework, a preliminary analysis was performed.
This was performed to help identify and categorize
examples of historical Launch Vehicle specific ground
processing operations tasks generally performed during
Ground Processing Operations. The specific tasks in
this research were matched with the associated HEART
nominal human “unreliability probabilities,” in order to
calculate the Human Error Probability (HEP). The
HEART Error Producing Conditions (EPC) were
matched with the HFACS conditions (human error
effects) to determine what category each fell under:
unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe
supervision and organization influences.
For this effort, informal discussions were conducted
with three (3) Subject Matter Experts (SME) (3 SMEs
with 34, 31 and 30 years KSC GPO experience). For the
HEART Generic Tasks, the SMEs identified and
categorized examples of historical shuttle specific
ground processing operations. For the HEART Surveys
used in this research, the SMEs identified general tasks
and error producing conditions associated with three (3)
NASA KSC Ground Processing Area Scenarios. The
SMEs were also asked to modify the HFACS’ four (4)
Levels of Human Error examples with the specific KSC
examples for categorization.
The framework below encapsulates the three (3)
scenarios in this research, relating to Ground Processing
Operations, Human error, the GPO tasks performed at
KSC, HFACS category levels and sublevels with
specific Error Producing Conditions, as it leads to
Human error related NASA mishaps.
Figure 1. KSC Ground Processing Operations
Human Error Framework [1]
3. METHODOLOGY
The Methodology used for this research consists of eight
(8) stages: Literature Review, Existing Gap, Experiment
Overview (Assessment approach), Data Collection
(Mishap Data and Survey Participant data), Qualitative
Study (HEART Method, SME Preliminary analysis and
HFACS Method), Surveys, Quantitative Study (HEART
Data analysis, HEP Calculation, and Binary Logistics
Regression), and Data Analysis – Validation
(Triangulation).
Figure 2. Research Methodology [1]
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For the Human Error Assessment and Reduction
Technique (HEART), survey subjects were asked to
answer a total of twenty one (21) questions. The
questions consisted of three (3) job related questions for
statistical purposes and eighteen (18) evaluation
questions involving three (3) NASA KSC GPO
Scenarios (VAB, OPFs and Pads A/B).
The assessment is based on the level of affect an Error
Producing Condition (EPC) may have on a specific GPO
task (very low, low, moderate, high, and very high).
For this research, forty one (41) KSC team members
with Ground Processing Operations experience
participated in the research survey. Participants’ average
years working at KSC is 23.9875 years (ranging 10 to
37 years). Participants’ average years working at KSC
supporting Ground Processing Operations is 19.8125
years (ranging 3 to 33 years).
Using the HFACS tool to categorize the Ground
Processing Operations (GPO) human error related
mishaps from October 1984 – May 2014, two binary
logistics regression models were generated.
The HEART Method was used to calculate predicted
Human Error Probabilities (HEP).
NASA Shuttle Mishap data from October 1984 – May
2014 was categorized and sorted into the HFACS Four
Levels of Human Error categories. The HFACS four
levels are shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3. Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) Overview [7]
The mishap data was further categorized into the eight
(8) HFACS Sublevels: Skilled Based, Routine
violations, Crew Resource Management, Perceptual
Errors, Exceptional Violations, Decision Based,
Physical Environment and Supervisory Violation.
For this research the HFACS human error probability
results are used for a Binary Logistics Regression
Analysis. The results from the analysis are represented
in Tab. 2 below.
The occurrence of a Mishap was identified as a
“response/event” and represented by a “0” or “1”. The
Regression Analysis was used to generate a regression
model in which the predicted probability of each
occurrence was calculated.
The Binary Logistic Regression Expression for this
Model is below:
P (1) = e (Yˊ) / (1 + e (Yˊ)) (1)
Table 2. Identified HFACS Regression Model Values
HFACS Human Error
Factor
Fitted
Probability
P
value
Odds
Ratio
Skilled Based 27% 0.070 10.15
Decision Based 41% 0.037 18.72
Perceptual Errors 47% 0.009 24.25
Routine Violation 9% 0.444 2.67
Exceptional Violation 36% 0.052 15.67
Crew Resource
Management 14% 0.283 4.38
Physical Environment 33% 0.138 13.72
Supervisory Violation 24% 0.226 8.61
In order to simplify the model, a Binary Logistics
Regression Analysis with Stepwise Backward
Elimination was performed. The analysis results are
below.
The Binary Logistic Regression Expression for this
Model is:
P (1) = e (Yˊ) / (1 + e (Yˊ)) (2)
Table 3. Identified HFACS Regression Model with
Backward Elimination P Values
HFACS Human
Error Factor
Fitted
Probability
P
value
Odds
Ratio
Skilled Based 27% 0.000 3.54
Decision Based 41% 0.005 6.60
Perceptual Error 52% 0.000 10.33
Exceptional
Violation 36% 0.013 5.38
Of the calculated HEART Human Error Probability
(HEP) values, three (3) values had the highest
probability (22%, 22% and 26%). These three HEP
values are from three (3) survey questions, which all had
an Error Producing Condition (EPC) commonality.
These commonalties are:
 Accessibility Limitations, Physical Stress and
Tiredness.
 Poor lighting dealing with the Physical
environment.
4.1 Binary Logistic Model Validation
For the Binary Logistic Regression model with Stepwise
Backward Elimination, all of the p value factors are less
than 0.05, thus indicating that they are statistically
significant.
Three Goodness-to-Fit tests are performed for this
research and all three tests’ p values are greater than
0.05, indicating that the null hypothesis for the first
hypothesis is rejected (Tab. 4). Therefore, HFACS
contribution factors do have an impact on human error
events in NASA GPO.
Table 4. HFACS Goodness-of-Fit Tests with Backward
Elimination P Values
Goodness-of-Fit tests P value
Deviance 0.725
Pearson 0.458
Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.795
5. MODEL VALIDATION
Model validation of the HFACS model was confirmed
by consistency and comparison to other research
conducted with the HFACS and data within the
aeronautics field.
Human Factors research conducted by Remotely Piloted
Aircraft (RPA) Operations [9], found that in prior
HFACS RPA mishap studies, 3 of the 5 studies’ largest
percentage of mishaps fell into the “Unsafe Acts”
category [10].
Another, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Mishap HFACS
analysis on recurrent error pathways on 95 Remotely
Piloted Aircraft Mishaps [8], identified that
“Perceptional” and “Skilled” Based Error pathways
(under HFACS “Unsafe Acts”) had common associated
latent failures. Together these are accountable for the
majority of crewmember related mishaps.
Lastly, a study of the Republic of China (ROC) Air
Force study [3] revealed that the ten (10) highest ranking
frequencies of occurrence fell within the “Unsafe Acts
(Level 1)” and “Preconditions for unsafe acts (Level 2)”
HFACS Categories. When comparing the ROC study
and KSC GPO, the highest frequencies of occurrence
are consistent with the Level 1 and Level 2 majority
Human error occurrence.
5.1 HEART Human Error Probability
(HEP) Validation
As stated in the results and discussion (section 4.0), the
three highest HEART HEP values from the survey data
had Error Producing Condition commonalities between
them (“Accessibility Limitations”, “Physical Stress”
and “Tiredness”).
By comparison, these HEART EPCs to the NASA
KSC Modified Levels of the HFACS, are best matched
with HFACS Preconditions of Unsafe Acts (Level 2)
sublevels “Physical Environment Confined Space” and
“Adverse Physiological States - Physical Fatigue.”
Through evaluation, there is some correlation between
the three (3) highest HEART HEP values (22%, 22%,
and 26%) from the survey data to the HFACS Physical
Environment Fitted Probability of 33% from the binary
logistics regression (before Backward Elimination) to
draw statistically valid conclusions.
It is noted that all three (3) SMEs contributions to the
developed Scenarios, tasks, subtasks and identified
EPCs all fell under the HFACS (Level 2) Preconditions
of Unsafe Acts Levels (Physical Environment Factor
and Adverse Physiological States) category. Also, in the
Preliminary Analysis of this study, many of the survey
participants stated that they believed one of the biggest
potential influences to human error mishaps in Ground
Processing Operations (GPO) is confined spaces, which
is a physical environment limitation.
Therefore the HEP probability values are consistent
with previous studies in this research that identify the
highest frequency and majority of human error
occurrences falling under the HFACS Level 1 and Level
2 Category.
6. CONCLUSION
The HFACS and HEART results and validation,
confirm that the KSC Ground Processing Operations
Framework is a valid approach for human error analysis.
The KSC GPO framework is flexible in that it allows
modification, for other operations. This capability was
demonstrated in this research, by modifying the
HEART’s “Generic Tasks” to specific tasks performed
in the Operation.
The research can be modified and used for complex
operations, such as other Space Operations and Space
Programs on an International Level.
Stages within the research methodology can be modified
for use in recorded or documented Safety surveillance
data over a period of time, as it relates to Operations and
failure occurrences. The final stage of the KSC GPO
framework encapsulates all of the error producing
conditions and covers contributing factors for both
models.
The central contribution of this research is a unique
complex operations framework that incorporates a
Human Reliability Analysis, Human Error Taxonomy
and Human Error Framework, as it related to Space
Operations.
Fig. 4 displays a set of steps that provides a research
Methodology approach that Space Operations and other
complex organizations may use to modify and apply to
their unique processes.
Figure 4. Research Methodology Contribution [1]
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